@justinahnbuilding @quidli

tbf, i agree with most of the things you post here are valid and true despite your way of conveying them 🤣 (ex. re: fumbles in lens protocol development by core team, why you feel betrayed as an artist that used the previous setup, etc.; re: the drama parts, i have less of an idea as i wasn't following)but re: decentralized social, it's clear you are not the core audience, which is totally fine as it's more of a technical and philosophical point than a consideration that a major end user should have; the importance of deso is more about giving you/devs/users the opportunity to own your graph in the off case that you should need to take ownership of it, which 99% of the time, most people will not, so again i think your opinion for yourself is validi do want to chime in though to say that you're able to make what you've made on base so far because there's not so many active users yet and so you're able to standout more; but imagine trying to do that if base app reaches the level of instagram or snapchat, not saying you wouldn't be able to but it'd be much harder to standout and compete at that pointwhich is why decentralized social is kind of cool; if the farcaster protocol is more widely adopted and you do reach a point where you want to leave the base app but retain your audience up to now, you would be able to do so!sorry to write so much, but long story short, i agree with you that deso doesn't matter for most. but it's necessary infra to helping everyone feel less trapped on platforms that would toss us aside the moment we're not at all useful for them.

@orbbuilt for artists, creators, degens, and you! 📲 discover fun in web3 powered by @lens. Now part of @masknetworkofficial

our interns is reading some of your feedback on v4 🫪

@vitalikmi pinxe lo crino tcati

I don't recommend anyone scramble to move their funds to new wallets today. But we should take the risks to cryptography from AI-accelerated math seriously, and minimize our exposure to not just quantum-vulnerable cryptography, but also potentially AI-vulnerable cryptography.The core new area of risk from this viewpoint is, unfortunately, ML-DSA / FHE / lattices.(and it's also another reason, along with quantum, why ECDSA might fall even faster than expected, hence the "fresh address" recommendation)So far most people have been in the mode of thinking "elliptic curves broken, hashes safe, lattices safe". But there is a good chance that the concrete security of lattices will take serious hits from the next two years of AI math.The basic threat model is: factoring is something that naively takes 2^(n/2) time, but over decades smart people have found and optimized number field sieves, and degraded that to 2^O(n^(1/3)), which is why RSA keys and signatures need to be ~400 bytes (and not 64 bytes). What if there are skeletons in the closet like that, both for elliptic curves and lattices, that we are simply not smart enough to discover - but bots soon will be?This is a major part of the reason why for the past year ethereum's lean roadmap has been going in the "hash-only" direction: no lattices, no ML-DSA, no Falcon, no lattice-based commitments inside ZK proofs, etc. Signatures in lean ethereum are all hash-based, either WOTS or SPHINCS-.For signatures and proofs, we already know how to go hash-only. The bigger challenge is for public-key encryption - and this goes far beyond blockchains. Secure communication, anonymizing protocols, lots of things need public-key encryption.And unfortunately there are long-standing mathematical theorems showing why public-key encryption cannot be done with hashes alone. You have to have some kind of trapdoor object that has at least one form of usable "structure" - either group theory (incl. isogenies) or lattices or code-based or potentially in the future even more newfangled and spooky things (local mixing?). But for anything that has structure, you should assume that AI will make at least some progress in breaking that structure. Here, one reasonable inference is that if you want to make something plausibly long-term secure, multiply the key sizes by 10.To me that's a very plausible world and something not at all extreme to predict. If AI will bring us 50 years of math in 2 years, then that 50 years of math may very plausibly include a "naive factoring -> GNFS" level of improvement to our ability to break lattices. In that world, lattices will still exist, but they will have to be significantly bigger to guarantee the same level of safety.And at those new larger sizes, hash-based constructions will beat lattice-based constructions on concrete efficiency in every use case where hash-based constructions are possible at all.Theoretically, of course it's possible that hashes are broken too (eg. P = NP would imply that). But I think P = NP is very unlikely. And intuitively, it's much more likely that a mathematical object has exactly no exploitable structure (like hashes are intended to), than that a mathematical object has exactly ~3 forms of exploitable structure (for elliptic curves: associativity, Schoof, pairings) and not some secret fourth form of structure we have not yet discovered that greatly degrades its security (for elliptic curves, ECDLP and pairing security). Similar for LWE, SVP, RLWE and the zoo of lattice problems.For this reason, we do not yet see any reason to worry and start padding the byte size of hashes (if we start to worry more, we would pad the round count first before doing anything to the byte size).Concrete TLDR, my own personal views:* Hash-based > lattice-based, in those situations where hash-based is possible at all
* For anything lattice-based, be much more paranoid on param sizes. Remember that blockchains are only a small portion of the cryptography story; this point goes far beyond blockchains and applies to eg. access to websites, secure messaging, Tor / VPNs ...
* For privacy protocols, strongly favor NOT putting encrypted notes onchain. Instead, send them offchain through some third-party mechanism.
If it's not difficult for you, keeping your funds in addresses which have not yet been used to make a transaction is a good idea. If it's easy for you, do it. But be careful about migrations; I personally have lost more money in botched migrations than I have lost in all hacks combined*.
* For multisig wallets, doing confirmations offchain is better than onchain, because this way the signatures of signer wallets do not get exposed to the public, so if ECDSA falls to AI much faster than expected, at least the multisig "gracefully degrades" to a 1-of-1 where the 1 is whoever was gathering the signatures - a much better place to be than "anyone can take the money"
https://firefly.social/post/x/2107837081313505768

@bossanovaGreat lover

Wow this must be the United States of America